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INTRODUCTION

On June 8th, 2009, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision
in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.1 The Caperton decision was important
because it marked the first time any $PHULFDQFRXUWUXOHGWKDWWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶V
JXDUDQWHH RI GXH SURFHVV UHTXLUHG D MXGJH¶s recusal, if that judge received a
disproportionate amount of financial support from a litigant in an election
campaign.2 This was true, although states had been popularly electing judges and
litigants had been able to financially support their campaigns, since 1832.3
Judicial recusal to avoid conflicts of interest has been a part of the American
legal landscape from its inception. The idea that judges should not preside over
cases in which their financial interests were at stake traveled with the common
lDZWR(QJODQG¶V1RUWK$PHULFDQFRORQLHVDQGEHFDPHDSDUWRI$PHULFDQOHJDO
tradition.4 Over decades, the grounds for recusal expanded beyond the narrow
JURXQGVRULJLQDOO\SURKLELWHGE\(QJODQG¶VFRPPRQODZDVWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
developed its own common law,5 and as the states and the federal government
enacted statutes that made more conflicts of interest subject to judicial recusal.6
However, until Caperton, financially supporting judges in their election
campaigns through lawful means had not been seen as creating a conflict of
LQWHUHVWWKDWFDOOHGDMXGJH¶VLPSDUWLDOLW\LQWRTXHVWLRQ
Caperton prompted a bevy of predictions from journalists, activists,
academics, and judges about what its implications would be for judicial elections,
and judicial recusal rules generally, throughout WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶ MXGLFLDO
system. The dissenting justices in Caperton expressed fear that the reputation of
state courts would be undeservedly brought into disrepute and that a loss of
public confidence in the judiciary would be the result.7 Outside of the Court,
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 39 Side B
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1
556 U.S. 868 (2009).
2

Robert Barns, Court Ties Campaign Largess to Judicial Bias, WASH. POST, June 9, 2009, at

A1.
3

PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT
ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (1980).
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4

See, e.g., John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 611 (1947); Charles
Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 671, 680 (2011);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57
BUFF. L. REV. 813, 826 (2009).
5

See generally Geyh, supra note 4, at 680±81.
Id.

7

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 902±03 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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some predicted that Caperton would not be followed by lower courts because of
its extreme facts or because of its unworkable standards.8 Others opined that
Caperton ZRXOGOHDGWRWKH³IHGHUDOL]DWLRQ´RIVWDWHUHFXVDOODZ9 while others
believed that Caperton would spur states to reform their recusal procedures.10
Some hoped that the decision would highlight the significant sums of money
being spent in judicial election campaigns and encourage the use of public
financing in these elections.11 Some feared that the decision could mean the end
of judicial elections.12
By surveying state and federal case law, and by looking at changes in
state judicial recusal rules, this study will examine how Caperton was received
E\WKHQDWLRQ¶VFRXUWVDQGOHJLVODWXUHVRYHULWVILUVWGHFDGH Overall, the survey
reveals that federal and state courts chose not to use Caperton as a vehicle for
changing judicial ethics rules: less than 250 published cases even mentioned
CapertonDQGLQRQO\RQHRIWKRVHFDVHVGLGDFRXUWILQGWKDWDOLWLJDQW¶VGXH
process rights had been violated because of disproportionate financial support
IRUWKHMXGJH¶VFDPSDLJQ13 The survey also revealed that among the 40 states
that hold judicial elections, and that did not already have rules addressing judges
presiding over cases involving contributors before 2009, only 15 states adopted
statutes or ethics rules that establish a duty of recusal in some situations when a
FDVHLQYROYHVODZ\HUVRUOLWLJDQWVZKRKDYHFRQWULEXWHGWRDMXGJH¶VFDPSDLJQ
and that only four of those states adopted a rule that resembled the American Bar
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8
See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, Extreme Facts, Extraordinary Case:
The Sui Generis Recusal Test of Caperton v. Massey, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 305, 327 (2010);
Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White, Caperton and Citizens United, 64 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011); see also
Anthony Johnstone, A Past and Future of Judicial Elections: The Case of Montana, 16 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 121±22 (2015); cf. Brief of the States of Ala. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 18±27, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
9
Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Mandatory
Recusal and Due Process, 28 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 359, 363 (2009).
10
See, e.g., Burt Brandenburg, Funding Justice: Big Money and Impartial Justice: Can They
Live Together?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 213±14 (2010); Adam Liptak, Keith Swisher, James Sample,
& Bradley A. Smith, Caperton and the Courts: Did the Floodgates Open?, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL¶Y 481, 486±88 (2015); Amanda Bronstad, Stage Set for Litigation over Judicial Recusal,
NAT¶L.
L.J.
(June
22,
2009,
12:00
AM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202431597348/stage-set-for-litigation-overjudicial-recusal/ (quoting James Alexander, Executive Director of the Wisconsin Judicial
Commission, ³Obviously, this will force states to review how they look at recusal, especially in
light of the campaign contributions and the issue of financial support given to candidates by third
parties, whether independent expenditures or through third-party groups.´).
11
See, e.g., Brandenburg, supra note 10, at 207±08; James Sample, Court Reform Enters the
Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787, 788 (2010).
12
Cf. Brief of Ten Current & Former Chief Justices & Justices as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 11±17, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
13
See infra Sections III.E, III.F.
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$VVRFLDWLRQ¶V 0RGHO 5XOH  $   ZKLFK OLVWV VSHFLILF DPRXQWV RI
FRQWULEXWLRQVWKDWUHTXLUHDMXGJH¶VUHFXVDO14
This Article also suggests several factors that might have contributed to
the reception that Caperton UHFHLYHGLQWKHQDWLRQ¶VFRXUts and state legislatures.
First, Caperton¶V reception in the courts can be partially explained by the
language used in the opinion of the Court. Scholars have long understood that
state and federal courts can blunt the impact of a Supreme Court decision by
distinguishing it from the cases before it or by narrowing it to its facts.15
However, recent scholarship suggests that the Court can induce greater
compliance with its decisions in the lower courts by using specific types of
language in its opinions, and this Article suggests that Caperton could be an
example of the Court exercising this kind of control.16 Second, this Article adopts
DQRYHODSSURDFKWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJVWDWHV¶GHFLVLRQVDERXWZKHWKHUWRFKDQJHWKHLU
judicial recusal laws to address campaign finance conflicts of interest by testing
the hypothesis that the likelihood of reform efforts was linked to perceived levels
of corruption in state government.17
Part II of the Article will discuss Caperton¶V facts, along with the opinion
of the Court and the dissenting opinions. Part III will discuss predictions that
were made by the justices, academics, state court judges, and others about
Caperton¶s impact. Part IV will examine how Caperton has been interpreted and
DSSOLHG E\ VWDWH DQG IHGHUDO FRXUWV LQ LWV ILUVW GHFDGH DORQJ ZLWK WKH VWDWHV¶
legislative and regulatory responses to the judicial conflict of interest problem
that it highlighted. Part V offers explanations for Caperton¶V reception at the
state level. Specifically, it presents an argument about how the wording of the
&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQLQCaperton might explain its reception in the judiciary. It also
presents a model to test the hypothesis that perceived levels of government
corrupWLRQPLJKWKDYHLQIOXHQFHGVWDWHV¶GHFLVLRQVDERXWZKHWKHUWRUHIRUPWKHLU
judicial ethics rules to during the decade. Part VI offers final thoughts about
future research questions and a possible future scenario under which Caperton
could become a more influential decision.
AN EXTRAORDINARY CASE BORN OF EXTRAORDINARY FACTS

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. was a case born of extraordinary facts.
It started when Hugh Caperton, the lead plaintiff,18 sued A.T. Massey Coal Co.
and its affiliates for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious

14
15
16

See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Sections IV.C, V.A±V.B.

18

The other plaintiffs in the case were Harman Development Corp., Harman Mining
Corp., and Sovereign Coal Sales. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009).
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See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.C.
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interference with existing contractual relations in West Virginia.19 In August
2002, a jury awarded the plaintiffs $50 million in compensatory and punitive
damages.20 7KH WULDO FRXUW GHQLHG 0DVVH\¶V PRWLRQ WR KDYH Whe verdict and
damage award set aside in June 2004 and denied its motion for judgment as a
matter of law in March 2005.21
$V WKH VWDWH¶V RQO\ DSSHOODWH FRXUW WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW RI $SSHDOV RI
West Virginia (³West Virginia Supreme Court´) would consider any appeal that
Massey filed.22 +RSLQJWRLPSURYH0DVVH\¶VFKDQFHVRIZLQQLQJRQDSSHDO'RQ
%ODQNHQVKLS 0DVVH\¶V FKDLUPDQ DQG FKLHI-executive officer, decided to
LQWHUYHQHLQWKHVWDWH¶VXSFRPLQJVXSUHPHFRXUWHOHFWLRQV in fall 2004.23 In that
election, Democratic Justice Warren R. McGraw was seeking reelection against
a Republican challenger, Brent Benjamin. Blankenship began a campaign to
unseat McGraw, charging that McGraw was bad for the business climate in West
Virginia and criticizing him for voting to release a convicted sex offender.24
Blankenship went to extraordinary lengths to elect Benjamin. He gave
$1,LQGLUHFWFRQWULEXWLRQVWR%HQMDPLQ¶VFDPSDLJQZKLFKZDVWKHPD[LPXP
allowed under state law.25 He also gave $2.5 million to a non-profit organization
FDOOHG³$QGIRUWKH6DNHRIWKH.LGV´26 The organization took advantage of a
provision of the federal tax code27 which allowed it to raise unlimited funds to
engage in political advocacy without having to pay federal income taxes.28
Blankenship hirHGDSROLWLFDOFRQVXOWDQWWRUXQ³$QGIRUWKH6DNHRIWKH.LGV´
which ended up raising and spending a total of $3.7 million to elect Benjamin.29
Blankenship spent an additional $500,000 in independent campaign expenditures
in support of Benjamin30 and gave $100,000 to another political action committee

20

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 41 Side A

19

Id.
Id.

21

Id.
Supreme Court of Appeals, W. VA. JUDICIARY, http://www.courtswv.gov/supremecourt/index.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
23
See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873.
22

24
Brad McElhinny, Big-Bucks Backer Felt He Had to Try, Coal Executive Put $1.7 Million
into Fierce Battle Against McGraw, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 25, 2004, at 1A.
25
26
27
28

Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873.
Id.
26 U.S.C.A. § 527 (West 2021).
See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873.

Hoppy Kercheval, Beth Walker Challenging Justice Brent Benjamin for Supreme Court
Seat, WV METRO NEWS (June 5, 2015), https://wvmetronews.com/2015/06/05/beth-walkerchallenging-justice-benjamin/.
30
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873.
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that was also working to defeat McGraw.31 In total, Blankenship spent over $3
million to elect Benjamin, which was more than the amount spent by all other
Benjamin supporters combined, and three times the amouQW WKDW %HQMDPLQ¶V
campaign spent.32 Benjamin ultimately unseated McGraw 53.3% to 46.7% in the
November general election.33
In October 2005, Caperton moved to disqualify the newly elected Justice
Benjamin from participating in the case, even before Massey petitioned for an
appeal.34 &DSHUWRQ DUJXHG WKDW %ODQNHQVKLS¶V VXSSRUW IRU %HQMDPLQ FUHDWHG D
FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVW WKDW UHTXLUHG %HQMDPLQ¶V GLVTXDOLILFDWLRQ XQGHU WKH 'XH
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the West Virginia Code of
Judicial Conduct.35 In April 2006, Justice Benjamin denied the motion to
disqualify himselfFODLPLQJWKDWKHKDGQRWEHHQSUHVHQWHGZLWKDQ\³REMHFWLYH
LQIRUPDWLRQ´LQGLFDWLQJWKDWKHZDVELDVHGDJDLQVWHLWKHUVLGHLQWKHFDVH36
Massey filed its petition for appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court
in December 2006.37 The court granted the petition, and, in November 2007,
reversed the $50 million verdict against Massey, three-to-two, with Justice
Benjamin casting the deciding vote in favor of Massey.38 Caperton sought a
rehearing, and both Massey and Caperton moved for disqualification of three of
the five justices who decided the case: Justice Benjamin, Justice Elliot Maynard,
and Justice Larry Starcher.39 -XVWLFH 0D\QDUG JUDQWHG &DSHUWRQ¶V PRWLRQ
acknowledging that he had vacationed with Blankenship while the case was
SHQGLQJDQG-XVWLFH6WDUFKHUJUDQWHG0DVVH\¶VPRWLRQDFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWKH
KDGSXEOLFO\FULWLFL]HG%ODQNHQVKLS¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQ-XVWLFH%HQMDPLQ¶V
election.40 Of the three justices, only Justice Benjamin refused to disqualify
himself from the case.41 The court granted the rehearing with Justice Benjamin
assuming the role of acting chief justice.42 In that capacity, he appointed two
lower court judges to replace the recused justices.43 Caperton then made a third
PRWLRQ IRU -XVWLFH %HQMDPLQ¶V GLVTXDOLILFDWLRQ DUJXLQJ WKDW Justice Benjamin

31
Paul J. Nyden, Opponents in Massey Suit Want Benjamin Off Bench, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Oct. 22, 2005, at 2A.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

42
43

Id. at 873±74.
Id.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 874±75.
See id. at 874±75.
Id.
Id. at 875.
Id.
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had applied the wrong standard for disqualification under West Virginia law, and
citing opinion polling evidence that two-thirds of West Virginians doubted his
ability to be impartial in this case.44 Justice Benjamin again refused to withdraw
from the case.45
The reconstituted court again divided three±two in favor of Massey in
April 2008, with Justice Benjamin again in the majority.46 In July 2008, Caperton
petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari to
UHYLHZWKH:HVW9LUJLQLD6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQRYHUWXUQLQJWKHSODLQWLIIV¶
verdict, which the Court granted.47
A. The Supreme Court’s Opinion and the Dissents

44
45
46
47
48
49
50

52
53

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 875±76.
Brief for Petitioners at 3, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
Id. at 15±16.
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872, 876.
Id. at 877±78.
Id. at 877 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520 (1927)).
Id. at 878.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2021

C M
Y K

7

11/16/2021 08:40:42

51

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 42 Side A

7KH &RXUW FRQVLGHUHG &DSHUWRQ¶V claims that the Due Process Clause
gave him a right to an impartial tribunal48 DQGWKDW%ODQNHQVKLS¶VRYHUZKHOPLQJ
efforts to elect Justice Benjamin created a probability of bias in favor of
Blankenship that violated this right.49 A five-justice majority decided the case in
&DSHUWRQ¶V IDYRU Writing for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy rooted his
RSLQLRQ LQ WKH &RXUW¶V SUHYLRXV GHFLVLRQV UHJDUGLQJ GXH SURFHVV DQG MXGLFLDO
disqualification. He began by noting that at common law, judges were required
to recusHWKHPVHOYHVZKHQWKH\KDG³DGLUHFWSHUVRQDOVXEVWDQWLDOSHFXQLDU\
LQWHUHVW´LQWKHFDVHDQGWKDWWKLVSULQFLSOHZDVHQVKULQHGLQWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶V
due process guarantee.50 Kennedy then noted two additional situations in which
the Court previously held that due process required recusal. The first situation
was when a judge had a financial interest in the outcome of a case that was not
as direct as that required by common law.51 The situation that typifies such a
conflict is when a judge receives compensation for finding a defendant guilty.52
6XPPDUL]LQJWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHVLQYROYLQJWKHVHVLWXDWLRQV.HQQHG\FODLPHGWKDW
the mere existence of an incentive to be biased against a litigant constituted a due
process violation; proof of actual bias was not required.53
The second situation in which the Court held that recusal was mandated
by the Due Process Clause was when a judge had a conflict of interest in a case
DULVLQJIURPWKHMXGJH¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQDQHDUOLHUSURFHHGLQJLQWKHVDPHFDVH

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 42 Side B

 

11/16/2021 08:40:42



74

ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹͳ

WEST
LAW
REVIEW
West Virginia
LawVIRGINIA
Review, Vol.
124,
Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 5

[Vol. 124

54
55
56
57
58
59
60

62
63

400 U.S. 455 (1971).
Id. at 465.
Id. at 469.
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881.
See id. at 883.
Id. at 883±84 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
Id. at 884.
Id.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 886±87.
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As an examSOH .HQQHG\ PHQWLRQHG WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania,54 which concerned a judge who found a defendant guilty of several
counts of criminal contempt for repeatedly insulting the same judge during the
GHIHQGDQW¶V WULDO RQ GLIIHUHQW FULPLQDO charges. The Court overturned the
contempt convictions in that case, VWDWLQJWKDWQRMXGJH³VRFUXHOO\VODQGHUHGLV
OLNHO\WRPDLQWDLQWKDWFDOPGHWDFKPHQWQHFHVVDU\IRUIDLUDGMXGLFDWLRQ´55 and
held that contempt charges that carry serious punishment should be tried by a
judge different from the one that presided in the proceedings where the contempt
took place.56 Kennedy used Mayberry, and other cases involving similar conflicts
of interest, to reinforce his argument that the Court had long held that the Due
3URFHVV &ODXVH¶V JXDUDQWHH RI D IDLU WULEXQDO FRXOG EH YLRODWHG ZLWKRXW
demonstrating that a judge was actually biased against a litigant.57
Claiming to have identified the common thread that bound together the
&RXUW¶VHDUOLHURSLQLRQVUHJDUGLQJGXHSURcess and recusal, Kennedy derived the
standard that he would apply in Caperton.58 Under this standard, due process
GHPDQGHG UHFXVDO ZKHQHYHU ³µXQGHU D UHDOLVWLF DSSUDLVDO RI SV\FKRORJLFDO
WHQGHQFLHVDQGKXPDQZHDNQHVV¶WKHLQWHUHVW>RIWKHMXGJHLQWKHFDVH@µSRVHV
such a risk of actual bias . . . that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee
RI GXH SURFHVV LV WR EH DGHTXDWHO\ LPSOHPHQWHG¶´59 Applying this standard,
Kennedy listed the facts that he thought demonstrated that Benjamin should have
recused himself. $OWKRXJKKHQRWHGWKDW³>Q@RWHYHU\FDPSDLJQFRQWULEXWLRQE\
D OLWLJDQW RU DWWRUQH\ FUHDWHV D SUREDELOLW\ RI ELDV WKDW UHTXLUHV D MXGJH¶V
recusal, . . WKLVLVDQH[FHSWLRQDOFDVH´60 .HQQHG\FRQFOXGHGWKDW%ODQNHQVKLS¶V
campaign efforts had a ³VLJQLILFDQWDQGGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHLQIOXHQFH´LQKHOSLQJ
Benjamin win the election, placing emphasis on the fact that Blankenship spent
three times more during the campaign to help Benjamin than all other Benjamin
supporters combined.61 Kennedy also noted thDW WKH WLPLQJ RI %ODQNHQVKLS¶V
intervention was important because it was reasonably foreseeable that if
%HQMDPLQZRQKHZRXOGEHRQHRIWKHILYHMXVWLFHVWKDWZRXOGGHFLGH0DVVH\¶V
appeal.62 Taken together, the disproportionate amount of financial support that
Blankenship gave to Benjamin and the timing of the contributions created a
SUREDELOLW\RIDFWXDOELDVWKDWYLRODWHG&DSHUWRQ¶VULJKWWRGXHSURFHVV63
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64
65
66
67
68
69
70

72
73

Id.
Id.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 887.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 876, 889 (quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948)).
Id. at 889.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 890±91.
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It is important to note that in his opinion, Kennedy used the word
³H[WUHPH´64 four times to describe the facts in Caperton and the words
³H[WUDRUGLQDU\´65 DQG³H[FHSWLRQDO´66 once each. Kennedy also observed that the
parties could not name another judicial election where a judge received such
disproportionate support from a litigant.67 Notably, .HQQHG\ZURWHWKDW³H[WUHPH
FDVHVRIWHQWHVWWKHERXQGVRIHVWDEOLVKHGOHJDOSULQFLSOHV´EXWWKDWLWZDVWKH
same extremity of their facts that made them more likely to transgress
constitutional limits, and that all of the cases in which it found that due process
required recusal were cases involving extreme facts.68 Caperton was meant to
provide an objective standard for courts to apply that would, in part, help them
to distinguish the extreme facts of cases like Caperton from situations that were
less extreme and, therefore, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.69
$V LI WR IXUWKHU GRZQSOD\ WKH DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI WKH &RXUW¶V RSLQLRQ LQ
future cases, Kennedy repeatedly noted that this decision would not displace state
ethics rules as the primary source of regulation for judicial campaign conduct,70
and made clear that states were free to adopt ethical standards for judges that
were more rigorous than the minimum standards required by due process.71
Kennedy concluded his opinion with the follRZLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ ³%HFDXVH WKH
codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process requires,
most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the
Constitution. Application of the constitutional standard implicated in this case
ZLOOWKXVEHFRQILQHGWRUDUHLQVWDQFHV´72
&KLHI -XVWLFH -RKQ 5REHUWV¶ GLVVHQW ZKLFK ZDV MRLQHG E\ WKUHH RWKHU
MXVWLFHVIRFXVHGPDLQO\RQWKHVXSSRVHGWLGDOZDYHRIOLWLJDWLRQWKDWWKH&RXUW¶V
opinion might set loose upon the American judiciary. Roberts charged that the
&RXUW FUHDWHG D UXOH XQGHU ZKLFK WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI D MXGJH¶V ELDV GLFWDWHG
whether that judge should recuse herself from a case, without any guidance about
what level of probability of bias required recusal.73 Roberts predicted that the
vagueness of the rule would invite a great number of recusal motions from
litigants claiming that judges were biased against them, that many of these
motions would be groundless, and that the increasing prevalence of these
motions would lead to more public skepticism about the impartiality of the
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judiciary.74 Roberts then listed 40 TXHVWLRQVWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQUDLVHGEXW
did not answer, which was intended to illustrate how difficult it would be for
ORZHU FRXUWV WR DSSO\ .HQQHG\¶V REMHFWLYH VWDQdard test.75 Roberts noted the
PDMRULW\¶V DFNQRZOHGJHment that Caperton¶V facts ZHUH ³H[WUHPH´ EXW KH
expressed doubt that this would stem the tide of recusal motions that he feared
the decision would cause, noting that many litigants were not deterred by a low
chance of success.76 Justice Antonin Scalia also wrote a dissent that echoed
5REHUWV¶FRQFHUQWKDW Caperton would lead to a flood of recusal motions that
would undermine public confidence in the courts.77
III.

PROGNOSTICATIONS AND PROPHECIES

Predictions about the implications of a Caperton victory came from
many quarters. This part of the Article will discuss the most prominent
predictions that were made about the consequences of a Caperton victory from
outside of the Court.
A. A Flood of Caperton Motions
As discussed above, the Caperton dissenters were deeply concerned that
WKH &RXUW¶V opinion would lead to an in increase in the number of recusal
motions.78 Furthermore, Massey and several amici gave similar concerns as
reasons that the Court should not rule in favor of Caperton.79 On the other hand,
the justices in the majority80 and some voices from academia81 cast doubt on the
prospect of a dramatic increase in recusal motions if Caperton prevailed, saying

74

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 43 Side B

Id. at 891.

75

Id. at 893±98.
Id. at 889. (Roberts used the United States Supreme Court as an example, noting that
although the Court granted certiorari on 1.1% of the petitions that it received the previous term, it
received 8241 petitions).
76

77
78

See id. at 902±03.
Id. at 890±903.

79
See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 44, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22); Brief James
Madison Ctr. for Free Speech as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 24±26, Caperton, 556
U.S. 868 (No. 08-22); Brief of Law Professors Ronald D. Rotunda & Michael R. Dimino as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15±17, Caperton., 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22); Brief of the State
of Ala. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28±29, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 0822).
80

Caperton, 556 U.S. at 888.
E.g., Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 229, 234 (2010); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Playing Forty Questions: Responding to Justice
Roberts’ Concerns in Caperton and Some Tentative Answers About Operationalizing Judicial
Recusal and Due Process, 39 SW. L. REV. 1, 66 (2009); Penny J. White, Relinquished
Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 120, 132 (2009).
81

10

C M
Y K

11/16/2021 08:40:42

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol124/iss1/5

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 44 Side A

 

11/16/2021 08:40:42



ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹͳ

2021]
CAPERTON
McLeod: <em>Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co.</em>: A Ten-Year Retrospecti 77

that the facts of the case were very unusual and that no comparable situation had
ever arisen in which a judge was asked to preside over a case involving a litigant
ZKRKDGJLYHQVXFKDGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHOHYHORIILQDQFLDOVXSSRUWWRWKDWMXGJH¶V
campaign.82 Justice Kennedy pointed out that courts had not been flooded with
motions following its previous decisions regarding due process and judicial
UHFXVDO EHFDXVH ORZHU FRXUWV UHFRJQL]HG ³WKH H[WUHPH IDFWV WKRVH VWDQGDUGV
VRXJKWWRDGGUHVV´83
B. Caperton Will Encourage Reforms Aimed at Increasing Judicial
Independence
Some observers predicted that a ruling for Caperton would aid various
reform efforts that were aimed at increasing the independence and impartiality
of state courts.84 The amicus brief filed by several interest groups in support of
Caperton cited a survey showing that 70% of Americans believed that campaign
contributions had some HIIHFWRQMXGJHV¶GHFLVLRQVDQGWKDWEHOLHYHGWKDW
wealthy people received different treatment in the justice system than everyone
else.85 These interest groups argued that a ruling for Caperton would encourage
reform efforts in several ways. First, by making it clear that the Constitution
establishes a limit beyond which recusal is required, a ruling for Caperton would
encourage states to enact clarifying rules that would establish a maximum
amount in campaign contributions that a judge could receive from a litigant in a
specified time period before having to step aside from a case.86 Also, these
groups argued that a ruling for Caperton would encourage states to adopt systems
of public finance for judicial election campaigns, and to adopt merit selection as
a system for selecting their judges.87
C. Caperton Will Lead to the End of Judicial Elections
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 44 Side A

Some commentators argued that a ruling for Caperton could encourage
states to abandon judicial elections. For example, in their amicus brief supporting
the Massey Corporation, Professors Ronald Rotunda and Michael Dimino
claimed that asking courts to determine whether campaign support by a litigant
created an unconstitutionally high probability of bias could not easily co-exist

82
83

Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887.
Id. at 888.

84
E.g., Brandenburg, supra note 10, at 213±17 (2010) (arguing that Caperton put pressure on
states to undertake recusal reform and providing several examples); Sample, supra note 11, at 793.

86
87

Id. at 13±14.
Id. at 14±16.
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Brief of Justice at Stake et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11±12, Caperton,
556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
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with judicial elections.88 The brief filed by several sitting and former state
supreme court chief justices also suggested the incompatibility of the probability
of bias standard with judicial elections, predicting increased difficulties with
fundraising for judicial campaigns.89 This author also predicted possible
problems with the continued viability of judicial elections after Caperton in light
RIWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQWKHIROORZLQJ\HDULQCitizens United v. FEC,90 in which
the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited limits on independent
election campaign spending by corporations and labor unions.91 Specifically, this
author speculated that a significant increase in spending in judicial elections by
corporations and unions could create more opportunities for Caperton-like
situations in which judges received disproportionate financial support from a
litigant, which would require recusal.92
D. Caperton Will Lead to the “Federalization” of Judicial Recusal Rules

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 44 Side B

In their amicus brief in support of the Massey Corporation, seven states
argued that a ruling for Caperton would effectively take away the power of the
states to regulate recusal in their own courts.93 The states argued, quoting the
Court in Microsoft Corporation v. United States, that the applicable recusal
LQTXLU\VKRXOGEH³DQREMHFtive one, made from the perspective of a reasonable
REVHUYHU ZKR LV LQIRUPHG RI DOO WKH VXUURXQGLQJ IDFWV DQG FLUFXPVWDQFHV´94
Given that there were different types of judicial elections, and different campaign
spending norms across the United States, the states argued that the reasonable
observer should take the perspective of a person in the state in question, as
opposed to a federal perspective.95 The states feared that by ruling for Caperton,
the Court would mandate the adoption of a federal perspective on judicial
FDPSDLJQ QRUPV WKDW ZRXOG ZHDNHQ WKH VWDWHV¶ IUHHGRP WR UHJXODWH WKHLU
judiciaries.96 Fear of the federalization of recusal rules was echoed in academic
quarters as well.97
88

Brief of Law Professors Ronald D. Rotunda, & Michael R. Dimino as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 20±21, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
89

Brief of Ten Current & Former Chief Justices & Justices Supporting Respondents at 11±17,
Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
90

Citizens United v. FEC., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See Aman McLeod, Change from on High? The Possible Implications of Caperton and
Citizens United for State Judicial Selection Reform, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 675, 681 (2010).
92
Id.
91

93
Brief of the States of Ala. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 9±10, Caperton,
556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
94

96
97

Id. at 11 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000)).
Id. at 11±12.
Id. at 13±14.
See Day, supra note 9, at 377.
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E. Caperton Will Lead to the Delegitimization of the Courts
Some voices also predicted that a victory for Caperton would spell
WURXEOHIRUWKHMXGLFLDU\¶VUHSXWDWLRQIRULPSDUWLDOLW\ Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Scalia expressed fear of this outcome in their dissents.98 The James
Madison Center for Free Speech echoed this prediction, saying that a flood of
recusal motions would leave the public with the idea that most judges were
corrupt and incapable of impartiality.99 An amicus brief by several state supreme
court chief justices also noted that a victory for Caperton could damage public
confidence in the courts because many of the resulting recusal motions and
public accusations of bias would not be understood by the public to be baseless,
even when they in fact had no merit.100 Furthermore, the chief jXVWLFHV¶EULHIDOVR
mentioned that judges would have to raise more money to fund public relations
campaigns to counter the narrative that they were bought and paid for by their
campaign backers, which would only reinforce the idea that judges were
influenced by their campaign backers.101 The amicus brief filed by the states also
noted that an increase in recusal motions would itself tarnish the reputation of
the judiciary.102
F. Caperton Will Encourage Litigation Mischief

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 45 Side A

Another prediction was that a ruling for Caperton would lead attorneys
and others who anticipated litigating in the state to spend money in judicial
elections to avoid having a judge rule on cases in which they were involved in.
Routunda and Dimino expressed this concern in their brief,103 as did the James
Madison CentHU ZKLFK ZRUULHG WKDW ³D SDUW\ FDQ VLPSO\ FRQWULEXWH WR WKH
campaigns of judges he believes are likely to rule against him, thus ensuring that
WKHVH MXGJHV FDQQRW KHDU KLV FDVH´104 The brief filed by the seven states also
expressed similar fears that litigants would use a recusal standard that was based

98

Supra Section II.A.
Brief of James Madison Ctr. for Free Speech as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
25±26, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
100
Brief of Ten Current & Former Chief Justices & Justices Supporting Respondents at 18±21,
Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
101
Id. at 21.
99

102

Brief of the States of Ala. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 36, Caperton,
556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
See Brief of Law Professors Ronald D. Rotunda & Michael R. Dimino as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 14, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
104

Brief of James Madison Ctr. for Free Speech as Amicus Curiae at 27, Caperton, 556 U.S.
868 (No. 08-22).
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RQ D SUREDELOLW\ RI ELDV DV D WRRO ³WR VKDSH WKH FRXUW WKDW ZLOO GHFLGH WKHLU
GLVSXWHV´105
G. Caperton Will Have Little Impact on the Judiciary
Several commentators predicted that the Caperton decision would have
a negligible effect on the judiciary because its test for deciding when due process
demands recusal was so vague, or its facts would be seen as being so extreme,
that courts would rarely find that recusal was required. Commenting on Caperton
following the decision5RWXQGDQRWHGWKH³H[WUHPH´IDFWVRIWKHFDVHDQGWKH
difficulty of determining the probability that a judge is biased against a litigant.
Specifically, he FRQFOXGHG WKH IROORZLQJ ³:H DUH QRW OLNHO\ WR VHH PXFK
principled growth from Caperton because the majority does not create a test of
when the judge must disqualify himself. It simply lists various factors for the
MXGJH WR FRQVLGHU´106 A similar prognostication about Caperton¶V lack of an
impact was made by Bopp and Woudenberg, who argued that Caperton¶V
extreme facts would lead courts to avoid applying it in most cases, which would
presumably not involve fact patterns of that extremity.107
Professor Anthony Johnstone presented a different argument for
Caperton¶V future irrelevancy. Specifically, Johnstone predicted that Caperton
would become irrelevant due to developments in campaign finance practices
following Citizens United.108 Professor Johnstone wrote:

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 45 Side B

[Citizens United’s] deregulation of independent expenditures,
DQGWKHVXEVHTXHQWSUROLIHUDWLRQRIQHWZRUNHG³RXWVLGHJURXSV´
DQG ³LQGXVWU\ DVVRFLDWLRQV´ HQJDJHG LQ FDPSDLJQ VSHQGLQJ
makes an anachronism of the direct, disclosed, and
overwhelming contributions at issue in Caperton. Now big
donors hoping to influence the work of the courts enjoy a range
of national and state-based conduits for campaign spending that
are practically impossible to track for a litigant who might later
have grounds for a recusal motion.109
³'DUNPRQH\´LV another name for election spending and donations that
have hidden sources by using non-profits as the conduits that Johnstone
describes, so named because non-profits are not required to disclose the sources

105
Brief of the States of Ala. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 35±36,
Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22).
106

108
109

Rotunda, supra note 8, at 68.
See Bopp & Woudenberg, supra note 8, at 327.
See Johnstone, supra note 8, at 121±22.
Id. at 120.
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of their funding.110 In his article, Johnstone explained how a corporate CEO who
wanted to support the election of sympathetic judges could do so, while reducing
the chance that these judges would have to recuse themselves from cases
involving the CEO or the company. Johnstone noted that the CEO could direct
money from the corporate treasury to a non-profit industry lobbying group that
would then give money to a political action committee (³PAC´), which would
then make a contribution to another PAC or political non-profit that would
contribute to the judicial candidates¶ campaigns or engage in independent
expenditures on the candidates¶ behalf.111 Contributing through organizations in
this way can attenuate the appearance of a link between the judge and the donor,
thereby undercutting the argument that the judge might be biased in favor of the
donor.112 The efficacy of this strategy was further enhanced by the decision of
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in SpeechNow.org
v. FEC,113 which invalidated limits on the amount of money that can be donated
to non-profit organizations that engage in independent election advocacy.114
IV.

EXAMINING CAPERTON¶S SMALLER THAN EXPECTED LEGACY

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 46 Side A

Ten years after Caperton, it is possible to gain a holistic picture of what
the decision¶s impact has been on judicial recusal rules, judicial selection, and
judicial campaigns. It is possible to assemble this picture, in part, by looking at
how federal and state courts interpreted and applied Caperton in cases in which
litigants claimed rights violations under the decision. Other parts of the picture
can be obtained by examining the number of states that changed their recusal
rules to respond to the campaign conflicts of interest at issue in Caperton, along
with the nature of the changes that those states made. Still more parts of the
picture can come from looking at whether states have changed their judicial
selection systems since Caperton.
The overall picture gathered from these pieces suggests that Caperton¶s
impact was stymied by a combination of factors. These factors include the
following: (1) the unwillingness of state and federal courts to apply Caperton
broadly and robustly to situations involving claimed conflicts of interest and (2)
the failure of most state legislatures and state supreme courts to see a corrupting
influence from contributions to judges that required significant changes in their
recusal rules.115
110
Samuel C. Rhodes, Michael M. Franz, Erika Franklin Fowler, & Travis N. Ridout, The Role
of Dark Money Disclosure on Candidate Evaluations and Viability, 18 ELECTION L.J. 175, 176
(2019).
111
Johnstone, supra note 8, at 121.
112

114
115

See id.
599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 696.
See infra Section IV.B.
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A. Caperton’s Reception in the State and Federal Judiciary
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To understand Caperton¶s reception in the state and federal judiciary,
the author surveyed all the cases that mentioned Caperton in a majority or
concurring opinion in published, non-advisory decisions, from the date of
Caperton¶s publication in 2009 until the end of 2019. The cases were found by
looking for references to Caperton using the LexisNexis database. This analysis
focused on references to Caperton in majority or concurring opinions because
these opinions dictate the outcome of the case, and because these are generally
more influential as precedents than dissents.116 The study only examined
published, non-advisory opinions, because unpublished opinions are generally
not cited and are of limited precedential value,117 and because most states that
issue advisory opinions prohibit their use as binding precedent.118
The results from the state courts present an interesting picture. There
were 16 cases from 13 states where Caperton claims were made against judges
because of campaign support that they received from litigants or their
attorneys.119 In only one of the 16 cases, a court found that the judge should have
recused himself under Caperton.120 Eighty-four state cases involved Capertonbased arguments to remove judges or other government decision-makers based
on allegations of bias that did not involve contributions, and 77 cases involved
situations where Caperton violations were claimed but were resolved under a
different state or federal law.121
Two examples illustrate the aforementioned treatment of Caperton in
state courts. In both instances, the state courts in question chose not to take the
opportunities that these cases presented to interpret Caperton broadly so that it
would apply to situations in which litigants spent relatively small amounts on
behalf of a judge as a proportion of the total campaign spending for that judge.
Further, the courts chose not to apply Caperton in additional situations where it
arguably could have been applied instead of state recusal law. The first example
is Williams v. Kisling, Nestico & Redick, L.L.C. (In re Breaux)122 in which a

116
See Thomas B. Bennett, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin, & Susan Navarro Smelcer,
Divide & Concur: Separate Opinions & Legal Change, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 821±23, 839±
40 (2018).
117
David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass: Ending the Jurisprudentially Unsound
Unpublication System, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 685, 697±99 (2009).
118
Mel A. Topf, State Supreme Court Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review, 2001 L. REV.
MICH. ST. U. DET. COLL. L. 101, 106 n.21 (2001).

121
122

See supra note 119.
84 N.E.3d 1038 (Ohio 2017).
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To study the reception of Caperton in the lower courts, the author examined the subsequent
legal treatment of (i.e. Shepardized) Caperton looking for published cases. These cases were then
analyzed and categorized according to their treatment of Caperton and case type.
120
Daurbigney v. Liberty Pers. Ins. Co., 272 So. 3d 69, 77 (La. Ct. App. 2019).
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123

Id. at 1038±1039.

124

Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1038±39 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009)).

125
126
127
128
129
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plaintiff in a civil action against Kisling, Nestico & Redick, L.L.C. (³KNR´),
filed a motion to recuse the trial judge in the case, Judge Breaux, on the grounds
that KNR made an in-kind donation of billboard space to Judge Breaux¶s recent
election campaign, which helped her defeat an incumbent judge.123 Judge Breaux
and the plaintiff differed on what the fair market value of the use of the billboard
was, and on how much money was contributed to her campaign, but the Supreme
Court of Ohio accepted Judge Breaux¶s claim that the value of the billboard space
was $2,561.124 In deciding the case, the court described Caperton¶s holding as
requiring a judge¶s recusal ³µwhen a person with a personal stake in a particular
case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the
case by raising funds or directing the judge¶s election campaign when the case
was pending or imminent.¶´125 Applying this ³disproportionate influence´ test,
the Ohio court noted that it ³could not see how´ advertising space on the
billboard could have a disproportionate influence on the outcome of an election,
regardless of its value, and, therefore, denied that Caperton demanded Judge
Breaux¶s recusal.126 In failing to find a Caperton violation, the court also noted
that the facts of the instant case were less ³extreme´ than those in Caperton and
did not create an unconstitutional probability of actual bias.127 The other case,
People v. Nguyen,128 was decided by the Supreme Court of California, and is a
case that typifies those cases where a Caperton violation was claimed but that
was resolved under a different law.129 In Nguyen, a criminal defendant facing the
death penalty cited Caperton to support his claim that his trial judge was biased
against him.130 Specifically, Nguyen argued that elected judges were inherently
biased against capital defendants, out of fear of the political consequences of
ruling in favor of such defendants.131 The California Supreme Court dismissed
this argument, saying that Caperton was based on an extreme set of facts that
created an unconstitutional probability of bias, and that since no such probability
had been demonstrated in this case,132 the case should be resolved based on state
law.133

Id. at 1039±40.
Id.
354 P.3d 90 (Cal. 2015)
Id. at 142.

132
133

Id.
See id. at 140±45.
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Id.; Judicial Council of California, Fact Sheet: California Judicial Branch, CAL. CTS. 3 (Oct.
2020), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/California_Judicial_Branch.pdf (superior court
judges in California are chosen in nonpartisan elections).
131
Nguyen, 354 P.3d at 142.
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As noted above, these two cases represent instances where state courts
failed to take the opportunity to broaden Caperton¶s holding to more situations,
which, in turn, could have increased the impact of the case on each state¶s law of
recusal. Significantly, both courts pointed to the extremity of Caperton¶s facts as
a justification for limiting Caperton¶s holding to its facts. As we shall see later,
the U.S. Supreme Court sometimes leaves lower courts leeway to interpret its
decisions in ways that the Court arguably did not intend,134 but that it seems to
be able to limit this leeway by the language it uses in its opinions.135 These two
cases are possible examples of instances where the language that the Court used
in its opinion influenced lower courts to limit the use of that opinion as precedent.
The survey of lower federal court cases produced a similar picture. There
were only five cases involving claims of Caperton violations by judges, and in
no case did a court find that the judge had violated Caperton by refusing to
recuse. Interestingly, none of these federal cases involved conflict of interest
claims related to campaign contributions. There were 36 cases in which a
Caperton violation was claimed but resolved under some other state or federal
law. Also, Caperton was invoked in 30 state and 45 federal cases that did not
involve any claim of bias or request for recusal, but mentioned Caperton as a
case that stood for the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Caperton was cited in four U.S. Supreme Court cases.136 The Court
mentioned Caperton in Citizens United, claiming that Caperton did not stand for
the proposition that independent spending in elections undermines the public¶s
faith in democracy and that Caperton only addressed the issue of judicial
recusal.137 Caperton was mentioned in Justice Kennedy¶s concurrence in Nevada
Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan,138 and by the Court in Williams-Yulee v.
Florida Bar,139 decisions in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of state
judicial ethics rules against First Amendment challenges. In both instances,
Caperton was cited as indicating the constitutional and political significance of
the appearance of judicial impartiality. The Court has found a Caperton violation
in only one case. In Williams v. Pennsylvania,140 the Court overturned a death
sentence because one of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices that heard the
case on appeal had been the head of the prosecutor¶s office that sought the

See infra Part IV.B±C.

135

See infra Part IV.C.
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2016); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575
U.S. 433, 445 (2015); Nev. Comm¶n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 132 (2011); Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).
136

137

139
140

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
564 U.S. at 132.
575 U.S. at 445.
136 S. Ct. at 1910.
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imposition of the death penalty on the petitioner. The Court applied Caperton¶s
objective test and found an unacceptable risk of bias in this situation.
B. State Changes to Recusal Rules After Caperton
A discussion of Caperton¶s influence on judicial recusal rules must start
with the American Bar Association¶s (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
The ABA has issued model judicial ethics rules since 1924,141 and most states
have adopted some version of those model rules.142 Since 1999, the ABA has
included a provision in the Model Code that requires judges to recuse themselves
from a case when a judge knows or is informed that a lawyer or a litigant has
made more than a specified amount in campaign contributions to the judge over
a given number of years, with the amounts and the time periods left to the states
to decide.143 This provision was initially Canon 3(E)(1)(e), but now it is known
as Rule 2.11(A)(4).144 Before Caperton was decided in 2009, Alabama,145
Mississippi,146 and Alaska147 had ethics rules that addressed judges presiding
over cases involving campaign contributors.148 Many supporters of judicial
campaign finance reform believed that a ruling for Caperton would encourage
states to adopt some version of Rule 2.11(A)(4), or some other rules clarifying
when recusal was required when lawyers or litigants had spent money to secure
a judge¶s election.149 They argued that states would want to define the
circumstances giving rise to recusal for themselves, which would presumably be
preferable to leaving the matter for the courts, which might set vague and
uncertain boundaries.150 Although the ABA model rule did not address
141

Brandon A. Mullings, Impropriety of Last Resort: A Proposed Ethics Model for the U.S.
Supreme Court, 58 HOW. L.J. 891, 896 (2015).
142
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Terry Carter, Judicial Races, Litigation Likely to Heat Up, 34 A.B.A. J. E-Report 1 (2005).
Cynthia Gray, Judicial Disqualification Based on Campaign Contributions, NAT¶L CTR. FOR
STATE
CTS.
1
(Nov.
2016),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/16647/disqualificationcontributions.pdf.
143

144

Id.
Hon. Joseph D. Russo, Richard G. Johnson, & Jack DeSario, A Legal, Political, and Ethical
Analysis of Judicial Selection in Ohio: A Proposal for Reform, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 825, 831 (2010).
146
Id.
145

147
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ALASKA CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 5(C) cmt. (1998).
Note that in March 2009, while Caperton was pending, Kansas adopted a rule directing
judicial candidates to instruct their campaign committees to be cautious about soliciting
contributions from lawyers and others likely to appear before the candidate if elected so that no
grounds for disqualification are created. Kansas is included in the states studied below because its
rule is not as specific as that of Alabama, Alaska, and Mississippi, and it adopted the rule when the
Caperton decision was pending. See KAN. SUP. CT. R. 601B, Canon 4, r. 4.4, cmt. 2 (2009).
149
See generally Brief of Justice at Stake et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08-22).
150
Id. at 14.
148
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independent spending in judicial campaigns by litigants, its adoption by more
states could have provided a more definite benchmark for determining how much
financial support from a litigant created a conflict that demanded judicial recusal.
However, as discussed below, ten years after Caperton, only four states have
codified Rule 2.11(A)(4), even though the rule was intended to prevent the sort
of conflict at issue in Caperton and the flood of recusal litigation that some feared
following the decision.
A look at the legislative and administrative reaction to Caperton and the
larger issue of conflicts of interest created by litigant campaign spending reveals
that the states¶ responses ranged from inaction to the adoption of clear and
specific rules aimed at preventing judges from deciding cases involving those
who have financially supported their campaigns. A survey by the author using
the Westlaw database151 revealed that among the 40 states that hold judicial
elections, and that did not already have rules addressing judges presiding over
cases involving contributors before 2009, 15 states made some legislative or rule
change that addressed the subject in the decade following Caperton.152 These
responses took a variety of forms, and some more specifically addressed the
situations that require recusal than others. Michigan, for example, amended its
rules to mention Caperton and included more commentary to explain the
applicability of the decision, but it did not adopt any language approaching the
specificity of Model Rule 2.11(A)(4) about situations in which recusal is
necessary.153 Eight states adopted statutes or ethics rules that establish a duty of
recusal in some situations when a case involves lawyers or litigants who have
contributed to a judge¶s campaign; however, unlike Model Rule 2.11(A)(4),
these regulations omit any reference to contribution thresholds beyond which
recusal is required.154 In 2009, Connecticut and Kansas adopted a rule that merely
informs judges to instruct their campaign committees not to put the judge into a
position where the judge¶s impartiality could be questioned by soliciting
contributions from those likely to appear before the judge if elected.155 Only
Arizona, California, New York, and Utah adopted a version of Model Rule
2.11(A)(4) that mandates recusal when lawyers and litigants have donated a
151
The author used different databases for different portions of the research due to the differing
availability of information on various subjects in each database.
152
The research for this was done by searching for the relevant provisions of each state¶s
judicial ethics code wherever that was codified and examining the history of the provision to see
if any changes occurred during the time period under study.
153

155

CONN. CODE OF PROB. JUD. CONDUCT, r. 4.4, cmt. 3 (2019); KAN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT,
r. 4.4, cmt. 2 (2019).
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MICH. CT. R. 2.003(C)(1)(b)(2019).
ARK. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r. 2.11, cmt. 4A (2019); GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r.
2.11(A)(4) (2019); IOWA CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r. 51:2.11(4)(a)±(b) (2019); N.M. CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT, r. 21±211, cmt. 6±7 (2019); OKLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r. 2.11(A)(4) (2019); PA.
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r. 2.11(A)(4) (2019); TENN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r. 2.11(A)(4) (2019);
WASH. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r. 2.11(D) (2019).
154
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specified amount to the presiding judge.156 The supreme courts of Nevada and
Wisconsin considered and rejected rules that closely resembled Model Rule
2.11(A)(4),157 and West Virginia added commentary to its Code of Judicial
Conduct noting that it had not adopted Model Rule 2.11(A)(4).158 Interestingly,
Colorado took the step of clarifying that judges are allowed to hear cases
involving contributors but, in accordance with a different provision of the state
judicial ethics code, should not be told who gave money to their campaigns.159
This author suggested that states might adopt peremptory challenges as
a way of reducing litigation over Caperton recusal issues.160 Currently, 17 states
that have judicial elections allow litigants to make a peremptory challenge
against a judge who has been assigned to hear their case.161 A peremptory
challenge permits a litigant to have a judge removed from a case without having
to persuade that judge or another judge that a conflict of interest exists that would
warrant disqualification under the state¶s code of judicial conduct. This right only
exists in trial courts,162 and states differ as to whether this right can be invoked
in criminal cases, civil cases, or in both.163 In all these states, the rules allowing
for peremptory challenges coexist with rules mandating recusal in certain
situations.164 Research by the author using the Westlaw database showed that no
additional states adopted peremptory challenges in the decade following the
Caperton decision.
C. Other Relevant Developments in Judicial Elections Since Caperton
Clearly, predictions that Caperton would lead to a new era of judicial
selection reform did not come to fruition. Ballotpedia maintains a website that

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 49 Side A

156
ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r. 2.11(A)(4) (2019); CAL. CIV. PROC. § 170.1 (West 2021);
N.Y. CT. R., § 151.1 (2019); UTAH CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r. 2.11(A)(4) (2019).
157
Gray, supra note 143, at 11±12.
158
159

W. VA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, r. 2.11, Clerk¶s Notes (2019).
COLO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 4, cmt 3 (2020).

160

Aman McLeod, Changing the Rules of the Game: Deriving New Rules and Practices from
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 569, 579±82 (2011).
161

See RICHARD E. FLAMM, RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 311±604 (3d ed. 2018)
(the author here excludes Texas, which allows preemptory recusal only for visiting judges; West
Virginia, which only allows them for magistrate judges, is included in this list).
162
See, e.g., IDAHO R. CIV. P. 40(d)(1) (allowing for peremptory challenges against trial judges
in civil cases); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-804 (West 2021) (allowing for peremptory challenges
against district court judges only).
Compare ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 42(f)(1)E (2019), with ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 10.2(a) (allowing for
peremptory challenges against judges in civil and criminal cases respectively), and CAL. CIV. PROC.
§ 170.6 (2019) (allowing for peremptory challenges against any judge in a civil case).
164
FLAMM, supra note 161, at 7±8.
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describes the history of state judicial selection reform.165 A survey of that site
revealed that between 2009 and 2019, no state abandoned judicial elections.166
During that decade, North Carolina switched to partisan elections for its state
supreme court and court of appeals in 2016,167 while West Virginia switched
from partisan to nonpartisan elections the same year.168 Turning to judicial
campaign finance, Wisconsin enhanced its existing public financing program for
supreme court elections in 2009,169 only to defund the program in 2011.170 North
Carolina also ended its program of public financing for judicial campaigns in
2013,171 while West Virginia commenced a system of public financing for
supreme court elections in 2012.172 With that move, West Virginia joined New
Mexico as the only two states that offer public financing for any judicial
elections.173
Regarding some of the other prognostications about Caperton, fears that
a decision in favor of the plaintiff would lead to the federalization of state recusal
law never materialized, and if there was a flood of Caperton motions, few appear
to have been litigated to the appellate stage, which suggests that the courts have
not had their work greatly disrupted by these motions. Also, it cannot be ruled
out that there was some increase in voluntary recusals because of Caperton or
that more litigants might have engaged in strategic spending in judicial races to
influence which judges decided their cases than would have without Caperton.
However, if an increase in recusals or the use of strategic contributions had been
a serious problem in the eyes of state legislatures or of courts, one would assume
that there would have been a more robust regulatory or judicial response to
alleviate these problems. As it happened, the rather muted response that occurred

165

See
Judicial
Selection
Methods
by
State,
BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_election_methods_by_state (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
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in
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Carolina,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_North_Carolina (last visited Sept. 9, 2021).
168
Stephanie Wilmes, West Virginia Moves to Nonpartisan Judicial Elections in 2016,
WILLIAM
&
MARY
L.
SCH.:
STATE
OF
ELECTIONS
(Nov.
2,
2015),
http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/2015/11/02/west-virginia-moves-to-nonpartisan-judicial-elections-in2016/.
169
Patrick Marley & Lee Bergquist, Doyle Signs High Court Bill, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Dec. 2, 2009, at 1.
170
Bill Lueders, Public Financing of Elections a State Budget Casualty, WIS. ST. J., July 4,
2011, at A1.
171
Brent Laurenz, Key Judicial Elections on the Horizon for N.C., DAILY COURIER, Nov. 10,
2013, at A5.
172
Julie Archer, Fund-raising Sullies Judicial Candidates; W.Va. Should Finish Its Foray in
Public Financing, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug. 16, 2012, at P5A.
173
Public Financing of Campaigns: Overview, NAT¶L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing-of-campaignsoverview.aspx#clean (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
167

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 50 Side A

 

11/16/2021 08:40:42



ͳͳȀͻȀʹͲʹͳͳǣʹͳ

2021]
CAPERTON
McLeod: <em>Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co.</em>: A Ten-Year Retrospecti 89

174

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 50 Side A

suggests that neither of these issues was deemed serious enough to warrant
sweeping changes in judicial recusal rules.
There is little evidence to support the notion that Caperton led to a
decrease in the legitimacy of courts, as Chief Justice Roberts and others feared
that litigants would use the case to highlight alleged judicial conflicts of
interest.174 Polling on the legitimacy of state courts in general during the period
is not available; however, a publication by the National Center for State Courts
suggests that the size of state courts¶ civil dockets did not fall dramatically during
the period from 2009±2016,175 which might be expected if the public had lost a
significant amount of confidence in the judiciary. Given that around half of
Americans have a relatively low level of knowledge about national politics,176
and an even lower level of knowledge about state politics and government,177 it
is reasonable to infer that most of the public is not aware of potential conflicts of
interest in state courts involving judges and litigants who financially support
their campaigns.
Turning to spending in judicial races, Caperton does not appear to have
had a significant impact on campaign spending. Data from the Brennan Center
for Justice indicate that there was no overall downward trend in spending in state
supreme court races between 2009 and 2018.178 Total spending (in 2018 dollars)
on supreme court campaigns in the 2009±2010 cycle was $46.1 million, while it
was $39.7 million in the 2017±2018 cycle. However, in the three intervening
cycles, spending reached a high of $72.8 million in the 2015±2016 cycle and a
low of $37.4 million in the 2013±2014 cycle. What these data seem to show is
that while spending fluctuates depending on whether the cycle contains a
presidential election, Caperton does not seem to have discouraged judicial
candidates from accepting contributions, nor has it discouraged anyone from
spending to get their favored candidates elected.
Another related factor that could have contributed to Caperton¶s lack of
impact is the prevalence of dark money in campaigns. It is hard to know how

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009).

175

State Court Case Load Digest: 2016 Data, NAT¶L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. 1, 2 (2018),
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/29819/2016-Digest.pdf.
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See, e.g., MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 101±02 (1996); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE 17±45 (2013); Robert S. Luskin, From Denial to Extenuation (and Finally Beyond):
Political Sophistication and Citizen Performance, in THINKING ABOUT POL. PSYCH. 281, 282
(James Kuklinski, ed., 2002).
177
See, e.g., Samuel C. Patterson, Randall B. Ripley, & Stephen V. Quinlan, Citizens’
Orientations Toward State Legislatures: Congress and the State Legislature, 45 W. POL. Q. 315,
320 (1992); Donald R. Songer, Government Closest to the People: Constituent Knowledge in State
& National Politics, 17 POLITY 387, 390±95 (1984).
178
Douglas Keith, Patrick Berry, & Eric Velasco, The Politics of Judicial Elections, 2017–18,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 3±5 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201912/2019_11_Politics%20of%20Judicial%20Elections_FINAL.pdf.
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many donors are spending dark money, or how much of the spending on
campaigns is dark money, since the groups spending this money are not required
to report all of the expenditures that they make.179 However, if Johnstone is
correct, the increased ability of corporations and unions to disguise their money
through nonprofits might have resulted in fewer Caperton challenges than there
might have been in the absence of Citizens United and SpeechNow.org, which
increased the amount of money that can be spent on campaigns. Also, it cannot
be ruled out that Caperton has caused more judges to voluntarily recuse
themselves from cases involving litigants who financially supported their
campaigns than would have done so in the absence of the decision. However, the
presence of dark money or changes in some judges¶ recusal propensities could
not have made Caperton irrelevant, given that large amounts of money are still
spent through identifiable channels.180 The courts could have robustly applied
Caperton to require recusal in cases where litigants were known to have spent
disproportionate amounts to secure a judge¶s election in those cases that reached
appellate courts, and more state governments could have made recusal laws more
robust to prevent these conflicts of interest. The fact that neither reaction
occurred181 suggests that other causes for Caperton¶s reception in the courts and
state governments must be investigated.
V.

UNDERSTANDING THE RESPONSES TO CAPERTON

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 50 Side B

This Article presents hypotheses that offer some explanation for
Caperton¶s treatment by the lower courts and state actions regarding judicial
campaign conflicts of interest in the decade after the decision. The hypothesis
regarding Caperton¶s reception in the courts relies on recent scholarship
suggesting the ability of the United State Supreme Court to induce lower court
compliance with its precedents with the language that it uses in its opinions. The
hypothesis regarding the reasons for the states¶ responses to Caperton posits a
relationship between the level of perceived corruption in state government and
the likelihood that a state would make significant recusal rule changes regarding
litigant contributors between 2009 and 2019.
A. Lower Court Compliance Through Opinion Language
The lower courts¶ failure to use Caperton as an opportunity to limit
perceived conflicts of interest caused by campaign spending is interesting
considering the concern that many judges have expressed about the possible
effects that campaign contributions have on the judiciary. Although several
current and former state supreme court chief justices wrote a brief urging the

See Rhodes, supra note 110, at 177.

180

See KEITH, supra note 178, at 3±5.
See supra Parts III.G±IV.A.

181
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Court to rule in favor of Massey,182 many other judges have expressed concerns
about the influence that campaign contributions can have on judges.183 For
example, according to one survey of state judges in the early 2000¶s, 80% of the
respondents expressed concern that judges were hearing cases involving people
who contributed to their campaigns.184 Furthermore, state judges promoted
efforts to eliminate judicial elections because of concerns about the influence of
contributors,185 to provide public financing for judicial campaigns, and to enact
recusal rules that prohibit judges from hearing cases involving contributors.186
Considering this evidence, why did Caperton receive the treatment that
it did in the lower courts? Scholars have established that lower courts can
exercise discretion in how they interpret and apply United States Supreme Court
decisions in order to shape the impact of those decisions on the law and public
policy.187 For example, Professor Neil T. Romans studied this phenomenon by
examining the lower courts¶ treatment of two of the Supreme Court¶s landmark
criminal procedure decisions of the 1960s, Escobedo v. Illinois188 and Miranda
v. Arizona.189 Romans found the 36 state supreme courts narrowed Escobedo to
its facts by distinguishing it from the facts in the cases they were considering, 190
and 34 courts gave Miranda narrow interpretations that limited its effects.191 In
both instances, these lower courts arguably limited each case¶s influence in ways
that the Supreme Court did not intend.192 Given the concerns that many judges
have about the effect of election spending on judicial impartiality, and with these
examples of lower court disobedience in mind, the question is, why did the lower
courts pass up the opportunity to enforce a more rigorous rule of recusal in

182
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Brief of Ten Current & Former Chief Justices & Justices Supporting Respondents at 11±17,
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08-22).
183
E.g., Paul J. De Muniz, Eroding the Public’s Confidence in Judicial Impartiality: First
Amendment Federal Jurisprudence and Special Interest Financing of Judicial Campaigns, 67 ALA.
L. REV. 763, 768 (2004); Bill Rankin, Ex-Justice: Drop Judicial Elections, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Aug. 13, 2013, at 3B.
184
Gary Martin, Gifts to Judges’ Campaigns Troubling to Voters, Jurists, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 15, 2002.
185
See North Carolinians Favor Change in Judicial Selection Process, PR NEWSWIRE ASS¶N,
Mar. 15, 1989.
186
Shirly S. Arbrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 999 (2001).
187
See, e.g., Jerry K. Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates
During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 260, 283±85 (1971).
188
189

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

191
192

See id. at 56.
See id. at 58.
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Miranda, and the Use of Judicial Impact Analysis, 27 W. POL. Q. 38, 48 (1974).
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situations where litigants have given significant financial support to a judge¶s
campaign?
Although studies have looked at a number of factors that affect the
likelihood of lower court compliance with Supreme Court precedent,193
Caperton¶s reception in the lower courts could be seen as an example of a
phenomenon identified in recent studies that have been done on the Supreme
Court¶s use of language in its opinions to influence different audiences.194 This
is arguably the newest approach to understanding how the Supreme Court
influences the behavior of lower courts and has been made possible by the
development of software that can analyze millions of words in thousands of
opinions, using many different methods to measure clarity or other features of a
text.195 Specifically, Black et al.196 found evidence suggesting that the Supreme
Court writes clearer opinions when the federal circuit courts are more
ideologically dispersed in an effort to ward off conflicting interpretations of its
opinion by those circuits, while Professors Pamela C. Corley and Justin
Wedeking found that higher levels of certainty expressed in the language of a
Supreme Court opinion, as measured by the use of certain words, was associated
with more positive treatment by the precedent in lower courts.197
The findings regarding the Supreme Court¶s opinion language offer a
new and interesting approach to understanding Caperton¶s reception in the lower
courts. Note that Justice Kennedy repeatedly mentioned the extraordinary nature
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193
See, e.g, Scott A. Comparato & Scott D. McClurg, A Neo-Institutional Explanation for State
Supreme Court Responses in Search and Seizure Cases, 35 AM. POL. RSCH. 726, 736±44 (2007);
Benjamin J. Kassow, Donald R. Songer, & Michael P. Fix, The Influence of Precedent on State
Supreme Courts, 65 POL. RSCH. Q. 372, 378±80 (2012); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross,
Empirically Testing Dworkins’ Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1156, 1157±58 (2005); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Charles M. Cameron, The
Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court
Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 690±92 (1994).
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Id. at 74±79.
Corley & Wedeking, supra note 194, at 49±53.
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See generally, RYAN C. BLACK, RYAN J. OWENS, JUSTIN WEDEKING, & PATRICK C.
WOFLFARTH, U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS AND THEIR AUDIENCES (2016); Amanda C. Bryan &
Eve M. Ringsmuth, Jeremiad or Weapon of Words?: The Power of Emotive Language in Supreme
Court Dissents. 4 J.L. AND CTS. 160 (2016); Pamela C. Corley & Justin Wedeking, The
(Dis)Advantage of Certainty: The Importance of Certainty in Language, 48 L. & SOC¶Y REV. 35
(2014); Ryan J. Owens, Justin Wedeking, & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How the Supreme Court Alters
Opinion Language to Evade Congressional Review, 1 J.L. & CTS. 35 (2013); James F. Spriggs, II,
The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A Resource-Based Theory and Analysis
of Judicial Impact, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122 (1996) (discussing the results of studies showing that
language used in judicial opinions can influence the behavior of other government institutions, the
media, and public opinion).
195
E.g., BLACK, supra note 194, at 46±53.
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of the facts of Caperton.198 He also expressed his confidence that state recusal
rules would remain the primary source for recusal law199 and his belief that
application of the constitutional standard enunciated in the case would be rare.200
In fact, the entire thrust of Kennedy¶s argument was that although there had been
a due process violation in Caperton, such violations would be rare because due
process violations of this type will only be found in the most unusual of
circumstances, such as those where the actions of a government official ³shock
the conscience.´201 In light of the findings of Black et al. suggesting that the
clarity of a Supreme Court opinion affects its reception by lower courts, and
Corley and Wedeking¶s findings about the effects of the certainty expressed in
Supreme Court opinion language on lower courts, it is possible that the lower
courts¶ reluctance to apply Caperton or to find violations of its rule in more cases,
was partly a result of the language that the Court used in its opinion. Specifically,
the clear, definite, and repetitive language that the Court used to express its view
that Caperton violations should only be found in very rare circumstances, along
with expressions of its confidence that state law and judicial codes of conduct
would resolve most disputes regarding judicial recusal without resort to the Due
Process Clause, can help to explain why the lower courts refused to apply this
case more broadly.
B. Perceived Corruption and Judicial Conflict of Interest Regulation
1. The Independent Variables

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 52 Side A

Peremptory Challenges: A peremptory challenge allows a litigant to
force the recusal of a judge that she believes would be biased due to campaign
contributions. It seems possible that allowing these challenges could make it less
likely that a state would feel the need to change its ethics rules to demand recusal
due to excessive financial support for a judge¶s campaign, since the litigants
themselves can eliminate any perceived conflict of interest created by such
financial support. Accordingly, whether a state allows peremptory challenges in

200
201

Id.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009).
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198
See supra Part II.A. Note that studies of textual clarity, often referred to as readability, have
highlighted the fact that repetition of words can enhance clarity. See, e.g., S. Alan Cohen & Joan
E. Steinber, Effects of Three Types of Vocabulary on Readability of Intermediate Grade Science
Textbooks: An Application of Finn’s Transfer Feature Theory, 19 READING RSCH. Q. 86, 100
(1983); George R. Klare, The Role of Word Frequency in Readability, 45 ELEMENTARY ENG. 12,
20 (1968); Graciela Rosemblat, R. Logan, Tony Tse, & Laurel Graham, Text Features and
Readability: Expert Evaluation of Consumer Health Text, NAT¶L. INST. HEALTH 1 (2006),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.572.6491&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
199
See supra Part II.A.
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its trial courts was included as a variable in the model. This variable is coded as
a one if a state allows peremptory challenges, and a zero if it does not.
Social Indicators of Perceived Corruption: Caperton¶s original motion
to disqualify Justice Benjamin claimed that Blankenship¶s involvement in
Benjamin¶s campaign created a conflict of interest that required the Justice¶s
recusal.202 Many scholars have studied conflicts of interest on the part of public
officials as a form of government corruption both in the United States and around
the world.203 Some interest groups believe that campaign contributions to judges
and independent spending on their behalf, create a conflict of interest that biases
the judiciary.204 Furthermore, some studies have found that contributions can
influence judicial decisions205 and studies by Professor James L. Gibson206 and
by Gibson and Professor Gregory A. Caldeira207 found that acceptance of
contributions and spending on behalf of a judge by litigants harmed the perceived
legitimacy of a judge (operationalized as the judge¶s perceived impartiality) in
the eyes of the public.
Dr. Rajeev K. Goel and Professor Michael A. Nelson208 studied the
correlates of perceived government corruption at the state level in the United
States, using a measure of perceived corruption developed by Professors Richard
T. Boylan and Cheryl X. Long.209 Goel and Nelson found the level of perceived
government corruption to be negatively correlated with per capita state personal
income, positively correlated with the percentage of the state population living
in urban areas, and positively correlated with the state being in certain regions of

202

Id. at 868.
E.g., Seini O¶Connor & Ronald Fischer, Predicting Societal Corruption Across Time:
Values, Wealth, or Institutions?, 43 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCH. 644 (2012); Lorenzo Pellegrini &
Reyer Gerlagh, Causes of Corruption: A Survey of Cross-Country Analyses and Extended Results,
9 ECON. OF GOVERNANCE 245 (2008); Jakob Svensson, Eight Questions About Corruption, 19 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 19 (2005).
203
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E.g., Keith, supra note 178, at 2.
See generally Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial
Decision-Making, 7 ST. POLS. & POL¶Y Q. 281, 282 (2007); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M.
Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and
Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 69, 73±74 (2011); Aman McLeod, Bidding for Justice: A
Case Study About the Effect of Campaign Contributions on Judicial Decision-Making, 85 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 385, 400±401 (2008) (finding that in some situations, judges were biased in favor
of contributors to their campaigns).
205

206

James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy
Theory and “New Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 69±70 (2008).
207

James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Judicial Impartiality, Campaign Contributions,
and Recusals: Results from a National Survey, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 73, 81, 84±86 (2013).
Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, Measures of Corruption and Determinants of US
Corruption, 12 ECON. OF GOVERNANCE 155, 157 (2011).
209

Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Measuring Public Corruption in the American States:
A Survey of State House Reporters, 3 ST. POL. & POL¶Y Q. 420, 422±25 (2003).
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the country (e.g., the South, the West, etc.).210 In some models, the authors
substituted per capita income for educational attainment, and found that higher
levels of education were negatively correlated with the level of perceived
corruption.211
It is here hypothesized that factors correlated with perceived corruption
in a state will also be correlated with a state¶s likelihood of adopting measures to
mandate recusal. This hypothesis is based on the supposition that where there is
a greater perception of corruption, there will be a greater perceived need for clear
rules barring judges from presiding over cases involving their campaigns¶
financial supporters, as the greater general perception of government corruption
increases the perceived need to act against government corruption in all its forms.
Goel and Nelson¶s findings about the correlates of perceived government
corruption informed the selection of two of the corruption variables used in this
model. Analysis by the author revealed that the region variables that Goel and
Nelson used (Northeast and South), are significantly correlated with the use of
peremptory recusal, and with personal income and educational attainment, so
they were omitted from the current model to avoid problems associated with
multicollinearity.212 Since personal income and educational attainment are also
significantly correlated, this model uses educational attainment and omits
personal income. Doing this will also allow this study to test the findings of Dr.
Seini O¶Connor and Dr. Ronald Fischer, who found that self-expression values
(which emphasize quality of life, the value of the individual¶s right to selfexpression, and the right to political dissent), are associated with lower perceived
corruption within the countries they studied.213 Another study looked at the
correlation between liberalization values, which they measured using a variable
computed as an aggregated scale based on the items that have been used in
multiple World Values Surveys, and education. The authors found that support
for liberalization values was highly correlated with support for self-expression
values, and that there was a significant positive correlation between a
respondent¶s educational attainment and support for liberalization values.214

Goel & Nelson, supra note 208, at 165±68.
Id.

212
Multicollinearity refers to a phenomenon in which two or more independent variables
predict each other¶s values with great frequency (i.e. they are highly correlated). If two or more
independent variables that are highly correlated are included in a model, it is difficult to measure
how much influence each of the correlated independent variables is having on the dependent
variable. See, e.g., GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL
INQUIRY 122±23 (1994).
213

The authors used data from the World Values Survey to measure levels of support for
rational and self-expression values in different countries.
Alain Van Hiel et. al., Can Education Change the World? Education Amplifies Differences
in Liberalization Values and Innovation Between Developed and Developing Countries, PLOS
ONE
3±4
(June
21,
2018),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0199560.
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Accordingly, this model includes variables representing the percentage
of the state¶s population living in urban areas in 2010, and the percentage of the
population over 25 that had completed a bachelor¶s degree in 2009. The data on
urban population levels and educational attainment were gathered from the U.S.
Census Bureau.215
2. The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the study is whether a state made changes to
its judicial ethics regulations regarding recusal in cases involving litigants or
lawyers who had financially supported their campaigns. If a state adopted such a
change between 2009 and 2019, the variable is coded one, and zero if it did not.
A state is counted as having adopted such a regulation if (1) that rule specifically
addressed situations when judges should recuse themselves from cases involving
donors to their campaigns and specified either dollar amounts at which recusal is
necessary, or (2) contained language directing judges to consider whether
disqualifying bias, or the appearance of such bias, caused by presiding over a
case involving a contributor was present. Merely mentioning Caperton¶s
relevance in commentary without more specific direction as to how judges were
to determine whether they should recuse was not counted. Fifteen states were
coded as adopting rules fitting the above criteria during the decade.216
3. The Database

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 53 Side B

The database includes states. States that do not have judicial elections
of any kind were excluded, along with Alabama, Alaska, and Mississippi, which
hold elections, and which adopted rules regulating recusal in cases involving
donors prior to Caperton. Information about the state judicial selection methods
came from each state¶s entry in the Ballotpedia database.
4. The Model
The model was estimated using Firth¶s penalized maximum likelihood,
a technique that is appropriately used when the dependent variable is of a binary
nature and when the number of observations is relatively small.217

215

Data available at the United States Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/data.html (the
historical data used for this study are available at this database).
These states were Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington.
217

Gary King & Langche Zeng, Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data, 9 POL. ANALYSIS
137, 138±39 (2001).
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Table One: Regression Results218
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Percent of State
-.079
.152
Population over
25 with
Bachelor¶s
Degree in 2009

Chi-Square

P-Value

.297

.586

Percent of State
Population in
Urban Areas in
2010

.047

.029

3.364

.067*

Use of
Peremptory
Judicial
Disqualification

-1.122

.728

2.721

.099*

.707

.400

Intercept
-2.155
2.729
*= variable significant at the .1 level.
5. Analysis

218
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The results of the analysis mostly confirm the hypothesis stated above,
in that all the independent variables had the expected signs, and two of them were
significant at the .1 level. Specifically, the study finds that the use of peremptory
disqualification and higher levels of educational attainment are negatively
correlated with a state adopting recusal rule changes regarding litigants who are
financial supporters in the decade after the decision, while states with a higher
percentage of their citizens living in urban areas were positively correlated with
adopting such changes. For example, some of the states with the highest
percentage of their people living in urban areas adopted new recusal rules,
including Arizona, California, Connecticut, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Washington, all of which have urban populations that exceed 74%.219 By
contrast, only one state (Arkansas) which had an urban population below 60%

Degrees of Freedom = 3, Likelihood Ratio Test = 5.6039, Model Significance = 0.13554.

219
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Interestingly, Florida and Texas, with urban populations of 91.16% and 84.7% respectively,
failed to adopt new recusal rules. See Florida Demographic and Workforce Facts, CAMPAIGN FOR
ACTION, https://campaignforaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Florida-v1.pdf (last visited
Sept.
3,
2021);
Urban
Texas,
TEX.
DEMOGRAPHIC
CTR.,
https://demographics.texas.gov/Resources/publications/2017/2017_08_21_UrbanTexas.pdf (last
visited Sept. 3, 2021).
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adopted new rules. These results provide some support for the hypothesis that
there is a link between the public¶s perceived levels of government corruption,
and modification of state recusal rules to prevent judges from presiding over
cases involving those who have financially supported their campaigns.
VI.

CONCLUSION

THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS, THE POLITICS
SUPREME COURT 115±22 (2006).
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This study of Caperton¶s aftermath shows that there can be valuable
lessons learned by studying a case that did not bring about the significant changes
in policy that some observers had predicted. Specifically, this survey has
presented evidence that Caperton¶s reception in the lower courts is consistent
with the recent hypotheses that the clarity and certainty of the language of a
United States Supreme Court opinion can affect how lower courts interpret and
apply its decisions, and that the enactment of judicial ethics regulation might be
tied to perceptions of corruption. These findings suggest that more research
should be done on the effect that the language of Supreme Court opinions has on
lower courts¶ interpretation and application of those opinions. Two interesting
avenues of research in this area might involve studying the effects of the
following on lower court treatment of Supreme Court precedents: (1) the
repetition of characterizations of the facts in the Court¶s opinion (i.e., are the
facts ³extraordinary´, ³rare,´ etc.), and (2) the effect of the Court expressing its
expectations about how lower courts should or will apply its opinions. The
finding that perceived levels of corruption might be linked to a state¶s willingness
to adopt clearer rules to prevent judicial conflicts of interest raises an interesting
question about the link between perceived corruption and government ethics
reform. For example, do governments change their ethics rules to make them
more strictly guard against conflicts of interest at moments when perceived
corruption is higher? To answer this question, more research is needed into the
correlates of perceived levels of government corruption and government ethics
reform.
Although Caperton has not had as much effect on recusal law as some
had predicted, there is evidence suggesting that it might have more impact in the
future. Specifically, a study by Professors Thomas G. Hansford and James F.
Spriggs has found evidence that while lower courts tend to initially treat U.S.
Supreme Court precedents positively, over time, that treatment moves toward a
balance of negative and positive treatment until these treatments occur at nearly
the same frequency by the time the precedent is 20 years old.220 If Hansford and
Spriggs are correct about cases being treated differently over time, the lower
courts may yet use Caperton to bring about more widespread judicial recusal
reform in the coming decades if their treatment of it becomes more evenhanded,
in the sense that it is relied on to more frequently mandate judicial recusal. The
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catalyst for this change might be the push to end dark money in politics.
Proposals have been made at the state level221 and at the federal level222 aimed at
eliminating dark money by requiring nonprofits that in engage in political
advocacy to reveal the sources of their funding. If campaign spending continues
to rise, and if those who wish to financially support judicial candidates cannot as
easily conceal that support, more conflicts of interest of the magnitude of the one
at issue in Caperton might come to light, which could spur the judiciary or the
state legislatures to act on judicial recusal reform. In this way, Caperton may yet
see its day of influence come.
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E.g., Melanie Dowling, Commonsense Election Reform Means More Choice for Alaskans,
ANCHORAGE PRESS (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.anchoragepress.com/opinion/commonsenseelection-reform-means-more-choice-for-alaskans/article_9732203e-1567-11eb-949167dda11d3933.html; Howard Fischer Capitol Media Services, Movement to Eliminate ‘Dark
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from
Politics
Gains
Steam,
HERALD
REV.
(June
6,
2018),
https://www.myheraldreview.com/news/business/movement-to-eliminate-dark-money-fromarizona-politics-gains-steam/article_13c92648-6a10-11e8-8539-03e57f390579.html;
Charles
Stile, Feud Derailing Legal Weed and More; Dark Money Casualty in Murphy, Sweeney Fight,
COURIER NEWS, May 16, 2019, at A5. See also Dark Money: Outing Donors State by State,
RECLAIM THE AM. DREAM, https://reclaimtheamericandream.org/progress-disclose/ (last visited
Sept. 3, 2021).
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(Jan.
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(Jan.
19,
2019),
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